The Kandy Kingdom

The Kandy Kingdom

The Kandiyan Kingdom At Bay 1658 - 1687

The elimination of Portuguese power in Sri Lanka aggravated rather than solved the problems that confronted Rajasinha II vis a vis the maritime regions of the island. He viewed the Dutch forces as mercenaries he had hired, and he hoped, quite unrealistically as it turned out, that after his aims had been achieved, the Dutch would return whence they had come, leaving behind a few officers and stores for trade purposes. As for the Dutch, their policy in the East was always that of gaining political control over spice-producing areas, and where possible securing a complete monopoly of trade. In Sri Lanka, their aim was nothing less than the control of the cinnamon producing areas of the island, which they had no intention of handing over to Rajasimha II.

The Dutch claimed that the lowlands were being held as collateral security till the Kandyan ruler repaid the costs incurred in the expulsion of the Portuguese from Sri Lanka under the terms of the treaty of 1638. When, after the fall of Jaffna in June 1658, the Dutch presented their bill, it was evident that it had been computed with cynical disregard for equity. For one thing, the value of the cinnamon, areca, elephants and land revenue they had obtained from the lands they controlled was calculated, unilaterally, at far below their true commercial value. Once this artificially low valuation of benefits derived was set against their expenses, the balance due was stated to be 7,265,460 guilders which, considering the Kandyan ruler's resources, was a staggering sum far beyond his capacity to pay. Besides, the king's liability kept increasing with every day the Dutch forces were stationed on the island. Such, in brief, was the sum total of the title which the Dutch could lay claim to and realize its intrinsic weakness they did not make much of it. And not surprisingly Rajasimha II firmly refused to consider, much less recognize, the legality of Dutch rule in the maritime regions of the island. However, except in regard to Jaffnapatam where the Dutch took over the Portuguese possessions in their entirety, their control in other parts of the island extended to about the half the land area which the Portuguese had possessed.

Confronted with overwhelming evidence of Dutch duplicity, Rajasimha II retaliated by resorting to frequent and destructive raids on the territories under their control. The Wallalaviti, Pasdun, Rayigam, Salpiti and Alutkuru Korajes were systematically devastated and denuded of their population, thus creating a belt of wasteland which served as a 'natural frontier between the king's dominions and those of the Dutch. But this frontier was nevertheless an artificial one, for the king's influence permeated the border regions under Dutch rule, and was not without importance in the other areas controlled by them. The loyalties of the Sinhalese to the Kandyan ruler were kept alive. In the first two decades of Dutch rule in the maritime regions of the island, the dominant influence in shaping their response to the challenge posed by Rajasimha's militant hostility was Admiral Ryklof van Goens, who in 1656 had been given charge of the attack on the Portuguese possessions in South Asia. After the expulsion of the Portuguese from the island, he was stationed in Colombo as Commissary and Superintendent over Coromandel, Surat, Sri Lanka, Bengal, and Malacca. The immediate need in Sri Lanka as he saw it was to erect a powerful defensive ring on the frontiers of the Kandyan kingdom, especially on the more populated western and southwestern sides. Van Goens, no believer in defense per se, soon emerged as the most forceful and consistent advocate of a forward policy in Sri Lanka. His first move was to seize, in 1659, the Kandyan port of Kalpitiya, which fell after a brief assault. He viewed it as the first of a series of such attacks devised for the purpose of encircling and weakening the Kandyan kingdom and compelling it to come to terms and recognize Dutch sovereignty over the lowlands. In addition to a purposeful bid to gain control over Sabaragamuva, the Seven and Four Korales, van Goens sought to occupy the Kandyan ports on the east coast and thus impose an economic blockade on the Kandyan kingdom.

This forward policy did not receive the support of van Goens' superiors in Batavia, who was quite content to leave Rajasimha II in the occupation of the lands he controlled provided he left the Dutch in peace to exploit the economic resources of the parts of the island which they held. As a commercial organization, their primary concern was the extraction of the maximum possible profits from the lands under their control. But to do this it was necessary to show the people that the Dutch were there in Sri Lanka to stay, and to persuade them of their good intentions. Above all, they had a realistic understanding of the fact that the success of the seasonal cinnamon harvest, the trading commodity that had been the original cause for Dutch involvement in the affairs of the island, depended greatly on the goodwill of the king and the people. The Dutch administration in the island was expressly forbidden to embark on any territorial expansion at the expense of the Kandyan ruler, and van Goens was directed to pursue a conciliatory policy in order to restore good relations with Rajasiriiha II. As a result Kalpitiya, where the trade had been closed to the Kandyans after its occupation, was now opened to their traffic, and routes to the Kandyan kingdom were reopened in the hope that commercial and other contacts would be reestablished. This reluctance to extend Dutch territory in the island was part of a policy of restraint involving South India as well. With the conquest of the Portuguese possessions in Malabar in 1663, Batavia felt that the limits of Dutch territorial expansion in South Asia had been reached.

It was one thing for Batavia to formulate a policy of restraint but quite another to get van Goens to implement it, especially in a situation where the initiative lay so much with the man on the spot. Van Goens was a man of great influence (with the Directors of the V.O.C. in the Netherlands, to whom he appealed over the heads of the Batavian authorities) and vision. He was impressed by the island’s potential as a centre of Dutch interest in South Asia; he regarded Sri Lanka as being superior to Java, and felt that Colombo and not Batavia should be the chief seat of Dutch power in the East. What he had in mind was the creation of a major sphere of Dutch interest in South Asia based on Sri Lanka (as its core) and the South Indian coast. For the moment, however, he gave in to Batavian pressure and desisted from any significant moves to extend the land frontiers of the Dutch possessions in the island. But these restraints did not extend to plans to expand the V.O.C.’s influence along the sea. The Dutch had laid claim to the exclusive possession of the littoral of Sri Lanka, and the right to keep out all other Europeans. Extensive tracts of the coast however were under Kandyan control, and this was especially signi¬ficant as regards the east where Trincomalee and Batticaloa as well as smaller ports served as centres of a thriving trade with India and beyond.

The most menacing prospect for the Dutch lay in the trade conducted by English and Danish merchants who from the 1650s were sailing into the port of Kottiyar in Trincomalee Bay in their port to port small-scale trading in the Bay of Bengal; the Kandyan ruler, for his part, actively encouraged this. The Dutch, on the other hand, were apprehensive about his control over ports on the east coast, not merely because it threatened their economic and trading interests: they realised that trade links could mature into political ones, and that it was through these ports that these would be established. All these questions assumed much greater urgency when the English East India Company began to show interest in acquiring a trading settle¬ment on the east coast of Sri Lanka. The English East India Company wanted a station on the island which would serve a dual purpose: it would enable them both to break the monopoly of the island's cinnamon trade which the Dutch had established, and to participate in the flourishing Indo-Sri Lanka trade. Well aware of the rift between the Dutch and the Kandyans, the English East India Company was encouraged to open negotiations with Rajasimha II to acquire a trading station and concession in or around Trincomalee. Besides, in 1659/60 the crews of two English vessels which had touched on the east coast had been captured by the Kandyans. The English East India Company's officials in Madras were urged to establish contact with Rajasimha II for the purpose of securing trade concessions and also to obtain the release of these captives.

The Dutch soon came to know of these plans, and tightened their naval watch on the Kandyan ports. Although both the English and the Kandyans went ahead with their negotiations, eluding the Dutch blockade as best they could, no official English embassy could be sent to Kandy. And nothing came of these negotiations, largely because the English were unable to give the Kandyan ruler the quid pro quo he wanted most the promise of armed support against the Dutch. The Dutch used their superior naval power in Asian waters to keep English vessels out of Kandyan ports. Nevertheless the English refused to concede Dutch claims of monopoly, and sought to exercise the freedom of the seas and free mutual relations with Asian rulers. But their attempt to gain entry on the east coast of Sri Lanka served to strengthen the hands of Dutch officials like van Goens, whose advocacy of further territorial expansion in the island became more persuasive in consequence. They now kept pressing for the occupation of the east coast ports—for Trincomalee at least and, if permitted, Batticaloa as well. Batavia was at last persuaded of the danger of leaving the east coast unoccupied, and convinced of the need to maintain a presence there to keep out other European nations.

Then in 1664 there came quite unexpectedly an opportunity, which van Goens grasped with alacrity, to embark on something much wider in scope than this limited programme of expanding Dutch control over the ports. A major rebellion broke out that year in the Kandyan One of these captives was Robert Knox who later wrote a celebrated book on the Kandyan kingdom: An Historical Relation of Ceylon (1st end, London, 1681; ed. James Ryan and publ. Glasgow, 1911). kingdom against Rajasimha II, led by Ambanvalarala, and although the king got the better of his adversaries, he nevertheless felt compelled in 1665 to seek Dutch assistance against the rebels. He asked for a detachment of Dutch troops in Kandy, and for naval patrols in east coast waters. In making this appeal Rajasimha II played right into the hands of van Goens, who had come back in September 1664 to assume the office of Governor for the second time. These unforeseen developments in the Kandyan kingdom strengthened him in his con¬viction that he was dealing with a weak adversary, who was no match for the Dutch.

In April 1665, three months after Rajasimha’s first appeal for assistance, two Dutch companies marched into the Kandyan kingdom, one from Colombo and the other from Galle, and occupied the two strategic strongholds of Ruvanvalla and Bibilegama. The aim was not to save Rajasiihha but to expand Dutch power and this latter objective they proceeded to accomplish; the territory held by the Dutch in the western and southwestern parts of the island was soon almost doubled in area. A mass emigration of people was encouraged from the king's lands to the Dutch possessions, to settle in and cultivate unoccupied land; all the while the impression was sedulously created that this was no aggrandisement at the expense of the king, nor a challenge to his authority. By 1667 Dutch power extended to the Four Korajes, and then up to Alawvva on the Maha Oya, which gave them a controlling position over the Seven Korajes. There was at the same time an infiltration of Dutch power on the east coast: in 1665 an expedition occupied and fortified Trincomalee, and by 1668 Batticaloa and Kottiyar were under their control. As in the west, these Dutch strongholds were used as nuclear areas to establish a dominance over the surrounding countryside.

All in all, the Dutch position in the island improved immeasurably in the period 1665 - 70. The area they now occupied was more than double what they had held before 1665; they had established a firm control over the entire coastline of the island, and this not only gave them much greater security against the prospect of trespassing by other European powers through the ports of the east coast but also gave the Dutch a position of complete dominance over the trade and traffic of the island. At the same time, the fact that they now had a larger population under their control meant that the problem of labor supply would be less acute than previously, just as the acquisition of rice-producing lands in the west improved the position regarding food supply. The cinnamon resources under Dutch control were substantially augmented by the expansion of Dutch power in the west of the island.

The extension of Dutch control over all the ports of the island had an economic motive which was just as compelling as the political one we have discussed so far—to establish dominance over the trade of the island. As we have seen, Kalpitiya was occupied and fortified in 1659, and the ports of the east coast had been brought under Dutch control between 1666 and 1668. With the construction of a lookout post in Panama and Magama in the south-east, the whole coastline was dotted with strategic points of control and inspection. And then in 1670 the decision was taken to establish a commanding position in the island’s trade. Cinnamon had been successfully and exclusively controlled almost from the very moment of the establishment of Dutch rule. The export of elephants, areca, chanks and pearls was now declared a monopoly of the Company, as was the import of cotton goods, pepper, tin, zinc and other minerals. Rice was the only major item of import left out. What they wanted above all was the control of the import market in textiles, and the export trade in areca.

A series of regulations was introduced to put this monopoly into effect. All vessels sailing to the island had to secure passes from the nearest Dutch factory in India; these were given only to the large well policed ports of Colombo, Galle and Jaffna where the visitors could be placed under surveillance. Boats were checked on the high seas. Apart from these restrictive measures, efforts also were made to keep the country supplied with textiles and to collect and export all areca in Dutch vessels. Capital was released for investment in cotton goods for the Sri Lanka market in Madura and Tanjore. These measures had consequences that were not entirely beneficial to the Dutch. Within ten years they contributed to a sharp rise in import prices, and led inevitably to the organisation of a flourishing smuggling trade in textiles and areca. To combat this an expensive cruising operation, with armed sloops, had to be mounted, and this continued well into the eighteenth century.

These, however, were long-term effects. Meanwhile Batavia was alarmed by van Goens’s repeated requests for reinforcements to support the extension of Dutch control into the border districts of the Kandyan kingdom on which he had embarked. These requests came at a time when Dutch territorial expansion was proceeding apace in many parts of South-East Asia. Again and again, Batavia sought to restrain the Dutch administration in Sri Lanka; it was increasingly critical of the expansion of Dutch power far into the interior, and was always cautioning against arousing the hostility of Rajasimha II. Van Goens, on the other hand, worked on the assumption that the Kandyan kingdom was crumbling through internal discord, and was too weak to survive for long against deter¬mined Dutch pressure. He believed that the whole island could be annexed if the Kandyans were defeated. But the crucial flaw in van Goens's policy was his facile underestimation of Kandyan resilience and strength, and events were soon to demonstrate the sagacity of Batavia's insistence on restraint. In September 1668 there came sporadic, localised uprisings against the Dutch in the Mada, Kadawata and Atakalan Korales, which compelled them to withdraw from the interior military strongholds of Sabaragamuva and Arandara, but resistance was not sustained and they were able to reoccupy these places. This, however, was a temporary respite, since the Kandyans were waking up to the perils of acquiescence in the decisive shift in the balance of power in Sri Lanka in favor of the V.O.C. They were especially uneasy about the zealous pursuit of a trade monopoly, and these economic pressures served to aggravate Kandyan anxieties over the policy of territorial expansion adopted by the Dutch since 1665. When the Kandyan counter-attack came in August 1670, it was a massive one, with the heaviest blows directed at the western and southwestern frontiers, and simultaneous attacks on Kottiyar, Batticaloa, and Panama on the east as well.

More ominous, for the Dutch, was the appearance of a French squadron under Admiral de la Haye off the east coast of the island, with which the Kandyans soon sought an anti Dutch alliance. This French squadron had as its main objective the establishment of a central base of French power in the East, preferably in Sri Lanka or in Banca at the Bantam coast. Encouraged by the eager response they had evoked from Rajasimha II, the French sailed into Kottiyar near the Dutch fort of Trincomalee and gradually entrenched themselves there. Rajasimha II for his part now increased his pressure on the Dutch, and intensified his attacks on a number of fronts. Besides, the Sinhalese under Dutch rule were incited to rebel against them, and once resistance broke out into riot or rebellion, the Kandyans extended their support to the rebels. The Kandyan army attacked the Dutch on the east coast, doubtless in the hope that the French could be drawn into the conflict. This the French refused to do being still at peace with the Dutch—to the great disappointment of the Kandyans, who had ceded Kottiyar to the French in the hope of obtaining their assistance against the Dutch. The Dutch, on the other hand, were not inclined to tolerate the French presence in Kottiyar under any cir¬cumstances, however discreet the French might have been, for they were deeply perturbed by Rajasimha’s bold diplomatic initiative in negotiating with the French for assistance against them. The French were easily driven out of Kottiyar, and not content with that, the Dutch proceeded to Coromandel with a reinforced fleet and forced the French to surrender at San Thome in September 1672.

The Dutch were less successful against the Kandyans. A vigorous trade blockade of the Kandyan kingdom was essayed, but to no visible effect. Although by the end of 1673 the Kandyan offensive appeared to have been contained, guerrilla activity continued sporadically, and Dutch control over the interior remained tenuous. And then in 1675 the Dutch suffered a heavy blow to their prestige when Bibilegama, an important fortified stronghold in the south, fell to the Kandyans. Once again this reverse was accompanied by massive desertion of lascarins and increasing guerrilla activity deep into the Dutch lowlands. Rajasimha II had demonstrated over the years 1670 - 5 that he was not the ineffective ruler without resource as portrayed by the Dutch officials on the island. He had shown great shrewdness in his choice of targets for attack, and had been successful in eliminating Dutch authority over much of the newly-conquered area. Nor had the Dutch policy of expansion undertaken after 1665 brought the economic benefits which had been anticipated. On the contrary it had burdened its authors with recurring and growing annual deficits. Worse still, the prolonged hostilities of these years had made it difficult for them to meet the annual target for cinnamon collection, while other eco¬nomic activities were even more grievously curtailed. Nor, for the same reason, had it been possible to organise the civil administration in the interior. Moreover the widespread simultaneous uprisings against them took their toll in manpower. Dutch military resources were spread thin over several fronts. When Batavia received urgent pleas for reinforcements, it was in no mood, or indeed in any position, to supply them at a time when there were major military involvements in the Archipelago, and when the Netherlands itself was facing a difficult war in Europe. Rajasimha II, in fact, compelled the Dutch to reappraise their policies in the island, for the events of 1670-5 served to convince the Batavian authorities of the wisdom of their opposition to van Goens’s forward policy in Sri Lanka. But Batavia’s review of the V.O.C.'s policy on Sri Lanka was nothing if not deli¬berate and long-drawn-out. At the end the Council finally decided as late as August 1677 that the only way out of the impasse in the island was to offer Rajasiihha II the return of all lands seized from him since 1665 and to abandon all the fortifications that had been erected there. The Dutch administration in the island was asked to make this offer in a letter to Rajasimha II.

However, the implementation of this policy was resolutely and successfully undermined. Ryklof van Goens was succeeded as Governor of the Dutch possessions in the island in 1675 by his son, who was fully in sympathy with his father’s views. The father became Governor Ryklof van Goens participated in these deliberations at Batavia as a member of the Council there. But, strongly opposed to this resolution, he did not sign the instructions sent to Sri Lanka. General at Batavia in January 1678, and with his son as Governor on the island was able to re-assert his influence over Sri Lanka policy. Between them the two men saw to it that matters reverted to the status quo ante 1675. But not for long, for the younger van Goens vacated his post in 1680 and was succeeded by Laurens Pyl (confirmed as Governor in 1681), who was much less enamored of a forward policy than his predecessors, and more realistic in his assessment of the Kandyan problem. The crux of the problem, as Phil saw it, was that Rajasimha II was strong enough to paralyze economic activity in the lowlands if he so wished, by preventing the peeling of cinnamon and threatening the coastal towns. Indeed, he viewed the contest between the Dutch and the Kandyans as an unequal one because the latter were able to field much larger forces. The cogency of his arguments strengthened the position of Ryklof van Goens' critics on the Batavian council, and a fresh review of Sri Lanka policy was initiated in 1681. The Governor General refused to participate in these discussions, but his influence was now at an end. He retired from office in November 1681, a sick and broken man. As the Council saw it, the raison d'etre of Dutch power in Sri Lanka lay in the island’s cinnamon resources, and all other considerations were not merely subordinate to this, but they should emphatically not be allowed to get in the way of the smooth functioning of the cinnamon monopoly. Territorial control in the island, and its attendant expenditure, were justified only in so far as it was needed for the maintenance of this monopoly. The aims of policy were pitched low in the hope that the basic minimum could be achieved without much expenditure. The Council resolved to reiterate the decision made in April 1677 to return to Rajasimha II the lands taken over since 1665. They took the precaution of naming in the resolution the districts to be returned, which were identical to those named in the 1677 resolution. At the same time, the Council urged upon its Sri Lanka officials the importance of coming to terms with Rajasimha II during his lifetime and if possible entering into a peace treaty with the Kandyan ruler recognising the pre 1664 frontiers.

If this resolution too was not implemented, it was because of the changing political situation within the Kandyan kingdom. Rajasimha II was not inclined to begin negotiations with the Dutch for as long as they held lands captured from him and were thus in a position of strength from which to drive a hard bargain. This was less important, however, than the reports reaching the Dutch in Colombo of the King's increasing debility, and these tempered their eagerness to negotiate terms with him. For the King was now in his eighties, and no longer active and vigorous in the pursuit of a forceful policy against the Dutch. It seemed sensible to watch events in the Kandyan kingdom, especially with regard to the succession to the throne. Thus the Dutch themselves lost interest in the attempt to remodel their relations with the Kandyans, and were reconciled to an unsatisfactory but tolerable stalemate. Pyl and the Council of Sri Lanka had reached the conclusion that the territorial status quo in the island should not be upset. In the event of a strong successor to Rajasimha II emerging, the Dutch would be in a formidable bargaining position with him. This consideration also ruled out any change in the boundaries during the last years of Rajasimha II's reign. The Dutch preferred a policy of inactivity, blended with constant vigilance. They were in favor of opening the ports for the trade of the Kandyans as a gesture of goodwill to pacify them; the Batavian authorities were persuaded to endorse this line of action. In the meantime, while Rajasimha II lived they followed a policy of tactful and prudent restraint, and of seeming submissiveness frequent embassies were sent to Kandy with presents for the king, and his permission was sought before the peelers were dispatched to the forests to collect cinnamon. This permission he generally granted, and peeling of cinnamon was seldom obstructed. In the last years of his reign, Rajasimha II appears to have been anxious to foster good relations with the Dutch so that he might leave behind a legacy of goodwill to his successor.