The Kandy Kingdom - IV

The Kandy Kingdom - IV

Contiued with part three   here to go previous one

These, however, were long-term effects. Meanwhile, Batavia was alarmed by van Goens’s repeated requests for reinforcements to support the extension of Dutch control into the border districts of the Kandyan kingdom on which he had embarked. These requests came at a time when Dutch territorial expansion was proceeding apace in many parts of South-East Asia. Again and again, Batavia sought to restrain the Dutch administration in Sri Lanka; it was increasingly critical of the expansion of Dutch power far into the interior and was always cautioning against arousing the hostility of Rajasimha II. Van Goens, on the other hand, worked on the assumption that the Kandyan kingdom was crumbling through internal discord, and was too weak to survive for long against deter¬mined Dutch pressure. He believed that the whole island could be annexed if the Kandyans were defeated. But the crucial flaw in van Goens's policy was his facile underestimation of Kandyan resilience and strength, and events were soon to demonstrate the sagacity of Batavia's insistence on restraint. In September 1668 there came sporadic, localized uprisings against the Dutch in the Mada, Kadawata and Atakalan Korales, which compelled them to withdraw from the interior military strongholds of Sabaragamuva and Arandara, but resistance was not sustained and they were able to reoccupy these places. This, however, was a temporary respite, since the Kandyans were waking up to the perils of acquiescence in the decisive shift in the balance of power in Sri Lanka in favor of the V.O.C. They were especially uneasy about the zealous pursuit of a trade monopoly, and these economic pressures served to aggravate Kandyan anxieties over the policy of territorial expansion adopted by the Dutch since 1665. When the Kandyan counter-attack came in August 1670, it was a massive one, with the heaviest blows directed at the western and southwestern frontiers, and simultaneous attacks on Kottiyar, Batticaloa, and Panama on the east as well.

More ominous, for the Dutch, was the appearance of a French squadron under Admiral de la Haye off the east coast of the island, with which the Kandyans soon sought an anti-Dutch alliance. This French squadron had as its main objective the establishment of a central base of French power in the East, preferably in Sri Lanka or in Banca at the Bantam coast. Encouraged by the eager response they had evoked from Rajasimha II, the French sailed into Kottiyar near the Dutch fort of Trincomalee and gradually entrenched themselves there. Rajasimha II for his part now increased his pressure on the Dutch and intensified his attacks on a number of fronts. Besides, the Sinhalese under Dutch rule were incited to rebel against them, and once resistance broke out into riot or rebellion, the Kandyans extended their support to the rebels. The Kandyan army attacked the Dutch on the east coast, doubtless in the hope that the French could be drawn into the conflict. This the French refused to do is still at peace with the Dutch—to the great disappointment of the Kandyans, who had ceded Kottiyar to the French in the hope of obtaining their assistance against the Dutch. The Dutch, on the other hand, was not inclined to tolerate the French presence in Kottiyar under any cir¬cumstances, however discreet the French might have been, for they were deeply perturbed by Rajasimha’s bold diplomatic initiative in negotiating with the French for assistance against them. The French were easily driven out of Kottiyar, and not content with that, the Dutch proceeded to Coromandel with a reinforced fleet and forced the French to surrender at San Thome in September 1672.

The Dutch were less successful against the Kandyans. A vigorous trade blockade of the Kandyan kingdom was essayed but to no visible effect. Although by the end of 1673 the Kandyan offensive appeared to have been contained, guerrilla activity continued sporadically, and Dutch control over the interior remained tenuous. And then in 1675, the Dutch suffered a heavy blow to their prestige when Bibilegama, an important fortified stronghold in the south, fell to the Kandyans. Once again this reverse was accompanied by the massive desertion of lascarins and increasing guerrilla activity deep into the Dutch lowlands. Rajasimha II had demonstrated over the years 1670 - 5 that he was not the ineffective ruler without resource as portrayed by the Dutch officials on the island. He had shown great shrewdness in his choice of targets for attack and had been successful in eliminating Dutch authority over much of the newly-conquered area. Nor had the Dutch policy of expansion undertaken after 1665 brought the economic benefits which had been anticipated. On the contrary, it had burdened its authors with recurring and growing annual deficits. Worse still, the prolonged hostilities of these years had made it difficult for them to meet the annual target for cinnamon collection, while other eco¬nomic activities were even more grievously curtailed. Nor, for the same reason, had it been possible to organize the civil administration in the interior. Moreover, the widespread simultaneous uprisings against them took their toll in manpower. Dutch military resources were spread thinly over several fronts. When Batavia received urgent pleas for reinforcements, it was in no mood, or indeed in any position, to supply them at a time when there were major military involvements in the Archipelago, and when the Netherlands itself was facing a difficult war in Europe. Rajasimha II, in fact, compelled the Dutch to reappraise their policies in the island, for the events of 1670-5 served to convince the Batavian authorities of the wisdom of their opposition to van Goens’s forward policy in Sri Lanka. But Batavia’s review of the V.O.C.'s policy on Sri Lanka was nothing if not deli¬berate and long-drawn-out. At the end the Council finally decided as late as August 1677 that the only way out of the impasse in the island was to offer Rajasiihha II the return of all lands seized from him since 1665 and to abandon all the fortifications that had been erected there. The Dutch administration in the island was asked to make this offer in a letter to Rajasimha II.

However, the implementation of this policy was resolutely and successfully undermined. Ryklof van Goens was succeeded as Governor of the Dutch possessions in the island in 1675 by his son, who was fully in sympathy with his father’s views. The father became Governor Ryklof van Goens participated in these deliberations at Batavia as a member of the Council there. But, strongly opposed to this resolution, he did not sign the instructions sent to Sri Lanka. General at Batavia in January 1678, and with his son as Governor on the island was able to re-assert his influence over Sri Lanka policy. Between them the two men saw to it that matters reverted to the status quo ante 1675. But not for long, for the younger van Goens vacated his post in 1680 and was succeeded by Laurens Pyl (confirmed as Governor in 1681), who was much less enamored of a forward policy than his predecessors, and more realistic in his assessment of the Kandyan problem. The crux of the problem, as Pyl saw it, was that Rajasimha II was strong enough to paralyse economic activity in the lowlands if he so wished, by preventing the peeling of cinnamon and threatening the coastal towns. Indeed, he viewed the contest between the Dutch and the Kandyans as an unequal one because the latter were able to field much larger forces. The cogency of his arguments strengthened the position of Ryklof van Goens' critics on the Batavian council, and a fresh review of Sri Lanka policy was initiated in 1681. The Governor General refused to participate in these discussions, but his influence was now at an end. He retired from office in November 1681, a sick and broken man. As the Council saw it, the raison d'etre of Dutch power in Sri Lanka lay in the island’s cinnamon resources, and all other considerations were not merely subordinate to this, but they should emphatically not be allowed to get in the way of the smooth functioning of the cinnamon monopoly. Territorial control in the island, and its attendant expenditure, were justified only in so far as it was needed for the maintenance of this monopoly. The aims of policy were pitched low in the hope that the basic minimum could be achieved without much expenditure. The Council resolved to reiterate the decision made in April 1677 to return to Rajasimha II the lands taken over since 1665. They took the precaution of naming in the resolution the districts to be returned, which were identical to those named in the 1677 resolution. At the same time, the Council urged upon its Sri Lanka officials the importance of coming to terms with Rajasimha II during his lifetime and if possible entering into a peace treaty with the Kandyan ruler recognising the pre 1664 frontiers.

If this resolution too was not implemented, it was because of the changing political situation within the Kandyan kingdom. Rajasimha II was not inclined to begin negotiations with the Dutch for as long as they held lands captured from him and were thus in a position of strength from which to drive a hard bargain. This was less important, however, than the reports reaching the Dutch in Colombo of the King's increasing debility, and these tempered their eagerness to negotiate terms with him. For the King was now in his eighties, and no longer active and vigorous in the pursuit of a forceful policy against the Dutch. It seemed sensible to watch events in the Kandyan king¬dom, especially with regard to the succession to the throne. Thus the Dutch themselves lost interest in the attempt to remodel their relations with the Kandyans, and were reconciled to an unsatisfactory but tolerable stalemate. Pyl and the Council of Sri Lanka had reached the conclusion that the territorial status quo in the island should not be upset. In the event of a strong successor to Rajasimha II emerging, the Dutch would be in a formidable bargaining position with him. This consideration also ruled out any change in the boundaries during the last years of Rajasimha II's reign. The Dutch preferred a policy of inactivity, blended with constant vigilance. They were in favor of opening the ports for the trade of the Kandyans as a gesture of goodwill to pacify them; the Batavian authorities were persuaded to endorse this line of action. In the meantime, while Rajasimha II lived they followed a policy of tactful and prudent restraint, and of seeming submissiveness frequent embassies were sent to Kandy with presents for the king, and his permission was sought before the peelers were dispatched to the forests to collect cinnamon. This permission he generally granted, and peeling of cinnamon was seldom obstructed. In the last years of his reign, Rajasimha II appears to have been anxious to foster good relations with the Dutch so that he might leave behind a legacy of goodwill to his successor.

If you interest to know more about the Sri Lanka followed Navigation to it

<<

>>